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 RELIGION IN THE ABORTION DISCOURSE IN
 SINGAPORE:
 A CASE STUDY OF THE RELEVANCE OF RELIGIOUS
 ARGUMENTS IN LAW-MAKING IN MULTI-RELIGIOUS
 DEMOCRACIES
 Seow Hon Tan
 I . . . appeal to hon. Members to face up to the challenge on this
 important social issue and give their full support to the Bill. I do
 hope that they will not falter just because of some pressure, social
 or otherwise, brought to bear on them by some minority groups
 outside who, on account of their religious dogmas, desire to
 impose their will on the majority ... I am certain that the
 opposing stand to this Bill taken by this minority group will also in
 the course of time end up in the dustbins of history.1
 Abortion, along with same-sex unions, is perhaps one of the
 world's most polarizing issues today. Laws on abortion vary across
 different jurisdictions, from prohibiting abortion under all circumstances
 to freely allowing it without restriction as to reason.2 Unlike rights such
 as freedom from torture or of speech, failure to recognize abortion rights
 is not necessarily the product of illiberal governments known to abuse
 * SJD, LL.M. (Harvard), LL.B. (NUS); Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); Associate
 Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. Part of this paper was presented at the
 Festival of Legal Theory at the University of Edinburgh in May 2008 when I was part of the
 National University of Singapore (NUS). I am very grateful to two anonymous referees and
 Professor Marie Failinger, the editor of this journal, whose comments and questions helped me to
 rethink and refine some of my own views. A word of thanks also goes to Esther Yee and Seow
 Zhixiang, my former student research assistants from NUS, for their assistance with finding
 materials.
 1. Sing., Parliamentary Debates , vol. 28, col. 891 (Apr. 8, 1969) (Minister for Health). The
 Minister, Mr. Chua Sian Chin, made these comments during the Second Reading of the Abortion
 Bill 1968 (so labeled as it was introduced on Dec. 3, 1968; see Sing., Parliamentary Debates , vol.
 28, col. 2). The debates during the Second Reading lasted from April 8 to 10, and will
 subsequently be referred to as the " Abortion Bill of 1968 , Second Reading."
 2. Approaches on abortion vary across different jurisdictions, from being illegal under all
 circumstances without exception to strict regulation where abortion is permitted only to save the
 woman's life - to moderate regulation where abortion is additionally allowed for the woman's
 health or mental health to laws that liberally allow abortion for socio-economic reasons or without
 restriction as to reasons (varying gestational periods). See World Abortion Laws 2008 Fact Sheet ,
 Center for Reproductive Rights (Nov. 20, 2008), http://reproductiverights.org/en/
 documenťworld-abortion-laws-2008-fact-sheet.
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 human rights, nor is allowing abortion indicative of a good human rights
 record. Extensive rights to terminate a pregnancy may be symptomatic
 of a government's policy for population control, as in the case of China,
 or it may be an expression of the liberal philosophy of autonomy, as in
 the case of Canada.
 The fact that opposition to abortion remains vociferous in many
 parts of the world may be surprising to Singaporeans today. But for a
 brief episode in the public square where my op-ed column in the main
 English language newspaper in Singapore stirred up a debate3 and
 culminated in parliamentary questions,4 there has been no major call for
 a review of Singapore's liberal abortion laws for the last three decades.
 Even as the number of abortions in Singapore rose, responses centered
 on the need for sex education and the inculcation of right values by
 schools and parents, rather than on campaigning against continued easy
 availability of abortion.5
 The history of legalization of abortion in Singapore stands in stark
 contrast to today's non-debate. Abortion was legalized after extensive
 parliamentary debates in 1969 and 1974. The parliamentary whip was,
 extraordinarily in a legislature dominated by one party, lifted for
 members to vote according to conscience. This, in itself, was
 recognition of the nature of the issue - that it was one on which people
 3. I wrote a column, Time for Singapore to relook abortion law, THE STRAITS TIMES, July
 24, 2008, making some of the arguments raised in this paper, after another writer had
 recommended that abortions be less easily available, in Make abortions less easily available , THE
 STRAITS TIMES, July 19, 2008. A spate of letters and articles followed: Medical veteran backs
 relook of abortion law , THE STRAITS TIMES, July 28, 2008; Banning abortion won 't mean more
 babies , THE STRAITS TIMES, July 31, 2008; Banning abortion will create more problems , THE
 STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 1 2008; It is a slippery slope when we take it upon ourselves to decide who
 deserves to be born and who does not , THE STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008; Special needs, but just
 as human , THE STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008; I hope we have become more civilized and humane,
 and not the opposite , THE STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008; Young doctor's account of abortion in
 the heartland , STRAITS TIMES ONLINE, Aug. 1, 2008; Harmful effects of abortion justify review ,
 THE STRAITS Times, Aug. 4, 2008; Ethically, should not willful termination be equivalent to
 murder ?, THE STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008; Why should the mother have more right than the
 man in the street to decide to 'keep' her baby?, THE STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008; Prof Tan had
 merely asserted that if the question of when human life begins is unsettled, we should err on the
 side of preserving what might well be a human life , THE STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008; Academic
 rebuts view on her article about abortion , THE STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008 (my response);
 Reviewing law on abortion timely in view of its adverse effects , STRAITS TIMES ONLINE, Aug. 6,
 2008.
 4. Government has no plans to ban abortion , THE STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 29, 2008. After
 that, the debate continued in the public square: Have committee to review abortion law , THE
 STRAITS TIMES, Sept. 2, 2008; Abortion: Access to information needed, not legal amendments,
 Straits Times Online, Sept. 4, 2008.
 5. Rise in number of abortions, teen cases also up , THE STRAITS TIMES, July 26, 2007. In
 2006, there were 12,032 abortions, up from 11,482 in 2005. The number of abortions for those
 under 20 also went up, from 1,279 to 1,391.
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 held strong views, often associated with religion. The lifting of the whip
 was arguably an endorsement of the legitimacy of considering diverse
 religious perspectives on such issues in public decisions. Yet, the then-
 Minister for Health, Mr. Chua Sian Chin, urged members not to falter in
 their support for the proposed legislation, the precursor of today's
 Termination of Pregnancy Act,6 because of "minority groups" which
 sought to impose their "religious dogmas" on the majority. He said the
 opposing religious stand would "in the course of time end up in the
 dustbins of history."7 He also noted that those whose ethical and
 religious beliefs forbade them from supporting abortion should at least,
 "in the name of humanity," abstain from voting against the Bill.8 The
 Abortion Act was passed in 1969, after commission to a Select
 Committee of the legislature, with a House divided into thirty-two ayes,
 ten no's, and one abstention.9
 Forty years later, religious views or views espoused by religious
 persons, whether in the context of abortion or in other contentious areas
 in the public square, have not been quelled. Rather, there is an increased
 interest in scholarship outside of Singapore on the ground rules for
 public discourse and reasons offered for law-making,10 especially with
 the flourishing of diverse views that is a natural consequence of liberal
 democratic societies. Of these, the best known is arguably John Rawls's
 idea of public reason,11 which has spawned many critiques. Whether
 religious viewpoints are relevant in public discourse and law-making is a
 major issue in the jurisprudential debate on the types of reasons that may
 be offered for law-making. In Singapore since the 1969 and 1974
 parliamentary proceedings in relation to abortion laws, the attitude
 towards religion in the public square has developed. Some have
 suggested religion is of no relevance; others have come to regard it as a
 constructive force, and contentious public decisions have sometimes
 been announced with reasons explained to representatives of religious
 6. Cap. 324, Sing. Stat., 1985 Rev. Ed.
 7. Abortion Bill 1968 , Second Reading, supra note 1.
 8. Id.
 9. Fifteen Members were absent. See Sing., Parliamentary Debates vol. 29, col. 349 (Dec.
 1969). The Third Reading was held over two days (Dec. 23 & 29). The debates during the Third
 Reading will be subsequently referred to as the "Abortion Bill of 1968 , Third Reading."
 10. See, e.g., DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
 (Stephen Macedo ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999); Amy Gutmann & DENNIS THOMPSON,
 Democracy and Disagreement (Belknap Press Harv. Univ. Press 1996); and Jürgen
 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms 287-387 (Mass. Instit. Technology 1999).
 1 1 . John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, with "The Idea of Public Reason revisited"
 (Harv. Univ. Press 1999) [hereinafter Rawls, The Law OF PEOPLES].
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 organizations.12 The parliamentary proceedings in 1969 and 1974 are
 interesting subject matter for analysis in view of development of
 jurisprudential literature over the reasons that may be offered in law-
 making and the more sophisticated understanding of the role of religion
 in Singapore's public square. Furthermore, there are continued calls for
 review of abortion laws in other jurisdictions.13 A review is timely to
 determine whether the reasons that undergirded Singapore's law remain
 valid.
 Using the parliamentary debates on abortion as a launch pad, this
 article examines the role of religious arguments in, and the ground rules
 for, law-making in a multi-religious democracy. It argues that ground
 rules for discourse and justification for law-making must accommodate
 religious arguments beyond those that pass the Rawlsian test of public
 reason. Intractable differences on moral (often religious) questions, as
 seen in Singapore's abortion debate, showcase the inadequacy of
 Rawls's attempt to delineate the public or the political. Although Rawls
 purported to leave metaphysical or religious questions unsettled by
 delineating a sphere of the political, he in fact resolved them whilst
 sidelining metaphysical (often religious) arguments.
 In Part I, I examine the approach to religion in multi-religious
 Singapore insofar as this sets the context for ground rules relating to
 discourse and decisions in the public square. As Rawls's approach is
 similar, I examine the views of Rawls and his critics. The Singapore
 government's approach, insofar as it is similar to Rawls's, faces some of
 the same criticisms. In Part II, I evaluate the abortion discourse in
 Singapore's parliamentary debates against Singapore's avowed approach
 to religion, as well as ground rules for discourse and law-making. For
 this purpose, I set out Singapore's abortion laws that resulted from the
 debates. I argue that the interaction of substantive arguments and ground
 rules reveals the unworkability of ground rules that purport to put
 metaphysical or religious arguments aside. In Part III, I conclude by
 examining the future of the abortion discourse in a pluralist democracy.
 I . Religion in the Public Square in Singapore ' s Pluralist
 Democracy
 According to the census of the Singapore government in the year
 12. See, e.g., the dialogue on the casino, reported in Casino: Not fruitful to keep arguing, says
 PM , The Straits Times, Apr. 27, 2005.
 13. See, e.g., a call by pro-choicers and pro-lifers for abortion laws to be reviewed occurred
 in relation to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill in the United Kingdom.
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 18 Dec 2018 00:56:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
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 2000, the religious composition of Singapore residents remained fairly
 stable over the preceding ten years. Taoists and Buddhists made up
 fifty-one per cent of the resident population aged fifteen years and over;
 Muslims fifteen per cent; Hindus four per cent; Christians fifteen per
 cent; and persons without religious affiliation fifteen per cent.14
 The Wee Chong Jin Constitutional Commission referred to
 Singapore as a "democratic secular state."15 Unlike the United States
 Constitution, the Constitution of Singapore does not have a religious
 non-establishment clause,16 although the freedom of religion clause
 specifies that no person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceeds
 of which are specially allocated in whole or in part for the purposes of a
 religion other than his own.17 Additionally, special mention is made of
 religious minorities in Art 152(1) which notes "the responsibility of the
 Government constantly to care for the interests of the racial and
 religious minorities in Singapore." The special position of the Malays as
 the indigenous people of Singapore is also provided for in the provision
 recognizing "the responsibility of the Government to protect, safeguard,
 support, foster and promote their political, educational, religious,
 economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay language."18
 Additionally, the legislature is required to provide for the regulation of
 Muslim affairs by law.19
 In recent years, the Singapore government has elaborated on its
 stance towards religion in Singapore. The White Paper on the
 Maintenance of Religious Harmony recognizes that religion can be a
 positive factor in the nation, providing its people with spiritual strength
 and moral guidance.20 But it notes that government must remain neutral
 amongst religions and may not favor any particular religious group.21
 Given the religious composition of Singapore, political views
 cannot be dismissed from consideration in the public square or in public
 decision-making just because they are expressed by persons who
 espouse particular religions. How does one navigate between inclusivity
 14. Department of Statistics Singapore, Highlights , http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/popn/
 c2000sr2/highlights. pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 201 1).
 15. Report of the Constitutional Commission 1966 , excerpted in KEVIN TAN & THIO Ll-ANN,
 Tan Yeo and Lee's Constitutional Law in Malaysia and Singapore 1020, 1025 1 38 (2d
 ed., Butterworths Asia 1997).
 16. U.S. Const, amend. I.
 17. Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 rev. ed.), art. 15(2). [hereinafter Sing.
 Const.].
 18. Sing. Const., art. 152(2).
 19. Sing. Const., art 153.
 20. Sing., White Paper on the Maintenance of Religious Harmony , Cmnd. 21 of 1989, ^ 6.
 21. Id. at Ц 5.
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 of religious perspectives and neutrality in the public square?
 A. The Government's Navigation of Religion in the Public Square
 While many of the statements on religions were made after the
 1969 and 1974 parliamentary proceedings, I examine them so that those
 parliamentary proceedings may be reassessed against these views. If a
 particular approach toward religion led to the abortion laws and the
 approach has changed, a review of the laws is timely. A survey of
 government statements shows that the government's navigation of
 religion in the public square has been marked by sensitivity towards
 religious groups, neutrality in decisions, and consultation with religious
 groups.
 1 . Sensitivity
 Foremost is the Singaporean emphasis on the need for sensitivity to
 religious differences in the public square. With the recognition of the
 vitality of religious harmony for order and stability in Singapore, the
 government introduced the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act22
 ("MRHA") to address two problems: that followers of particular
 religions exercise moderation and tolerance and not instigate religious
 enmity or hatred between different groups, and that religious leaders
 ensure that politics and religion are separate in the leading of their
 flocks.23 The Act allows restraining orders to be issued against officials
 or leaders to prohibit them from, amongst others, speaking or writing to
 religious groups, where the Minister is satisfied that the person has
 committed or is attempting to commit certain acts, including causing
 feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different religious
 groups.24 Restraining orders may also be issued against persons inciting
 religious groups to commit these acts.25
 The principles behind the Act, enunciated in the White Paper on
 the Maintenance of Religious Harmony, are pertinent to public discourse
 in Singapore. The White Paper exhorts the religious, in the exercise of
 their freedom of religion, to acknowledge the multi-racial and multi-
 religious character of society and sensitivities of different groups,
 emphasize moral values common to all, respect the right of individuals
 22. Cap. 167A, Sing. Stat., 2001 Rev. Ed.
 23. Sing., Parliamentary Debates , vol. 56, col. 326 (18 July 1990) (Minister for Home
 Affairs - Professor S. Jayakumar).
 24. Cap. 167A § 8(l)(a) & 8(2).
 25. §9.
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 to hold their views, and not be disrespectful to other groups or incite
 violence or hostility against other groups. Besides the MRHA, the
 government has repeatedly called for sensitivity and acceptance of
 differences in the common space shared by Singaporeans of different
 religions.26 For example, the Code on Religious Harmony recognizes
 the secular nature of the state and the need to promote social cohesion,
 respect one another's religion, foster inter-religious communication and
 ensure that religion will not be abused to create conflict and disharmony
 in Singapore.27 Religious pluralism, facilitated by an emphasis on
 harmony and tolerance, is here to stay, as the government recently went
 a step further to promote Singapore as an interfaith hub.28
 2. Neutrality
 Second, public decision-making may not be dictated by any
 particular religious group. The government might thus legally permit
 acts prohibited by particular religions. In relation to the proposal to
 develop integrated resorts, for example, the Minister-in-charge of
 Muslim Affairs, Associate Professor Dr. Yaacob Ibrahim said:
 [T]here are many things that exist around us which we do not
 agree with as Muslims, but accept as part of the wider landscape.
 Gambling, drinking and other activities that Muslims consider
 vices are not banned in Singapore. We understand that in our
 multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, it is not tenable for
 Government policies to be dictated by the views of one or any
 groups. If we go down that road, then should we ban abortion or
 the use of condoms because some religious groups are against
 them? Or, should we ban the sale of meat in line with the
 convictions of groups who believe animals should not be
 slaughtered for food? It is in the interest of all Singaporeans that
 policies are not dictated by the views of any group.29
 26. See, e.g., the Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs Dr. Yaacob Ibrahim's remarks in the
 Forum on Ethnic Relations held in 2002: Let's redefine common space , says minister , THE
 Straits Times, Oct. 25, 2002.
 27. Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports, Declaration on Religious
 Harmony , http://appl.mcys.gov.sg/Portals/0/Files/Declaration Eng.doc.
 28. Making Singapore an Interfaith Hub, THE STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006; see also the
 country report on Singapore, Human Rights Commission, http://www.hrc.co.nz/hrc_new/hrc/
 cms/files/documents/25-May-2007_l 3-46-30_Singapore_Country_Report.doc (last visited Mar.
 18, 2011).
 29. Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 80, col. 54 (Apr. 18, 2005) (Proposal to Develop
 Integrated Resorts). The "integrated resort" is the Singapore government's term for a recreational
 resort with a gaming component. See Lee Hsien Loong, Proposal to Develop Integrated Resorts
 (Apr. 18, 2005), available at http://app.mti.gov.sg/data/pages/606/doc/Ministerial%
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 3. Consultation
 Third, different religious groups are free to make their views
 known to the government. For example, in relation to the proposal to
 develop the integrated resorts, the Prime Minister acknowledged that he
 had received objections on religious grounds.30
 * * *
 These three prongs of Singapore's approach to religion in the
 public square - sensitivity to religious differences in the public square,
 emphasis on neutrality amongst religions in public decisions, and the
 choice to consult with, rather than dismiss the views of, religious
 persons - are hard to navigate in practice. This was seen in a heated
 debate over religion in the public square31 which erupted in 2009 when a
 group of new members (a civil society group, the Association of Women
 for Action and Research ("AWARE")) who attended an Anglican
 church32 in Singapore won executive committee seats at AWARE' s
 annual general meeting.33 They were opposed to the pro-gay agenda that
 AWARE was said to be pushing.34 It culminated in statements by major
 religious and government leaders in Singapore on the role of religion.
 The President of Singapore emphasized the need for tolerance, restraint
 and mutual respect for all to live peacefully in a multi-religious society,
 and said these values applied not only to religious groups in the secular
 20Statement%20-%20PM%20 1 8apr05 .pdf.
 30. Id.
 31. A note of thanks to my former student research assistant Ervin Chan for his research
 assistance on the AWARE issue. The roles for faith-based groups, THE STRAITS TIMES, May 16,
 2009; The virtues of secularism, THE STRAITS TIMES, May 20, 2009; Countries that have allowed
 religion in politics have created more issues, THE STRAITS TIMES, May 21, 2009; What a secular
 organization means in Singapore, THE STRAITS TIMES, May 22, 2009; Secularism practised in
 S 'pore 'does not exclude religion , ' THE STRAITS TIMES, May 27, 2009; Facts outshine faith, THE
 STRAITS Times, May 28, 2009; Disingenuous absence of a vital fact in NMP's speech, THE
 STRAITS Times, May 29, 2009; Reflecting one's spiritual view not the same as imposing one's
 religious sensibilities on others, STRAITS TIMES ONLINE, May 29, 2009; Militant secularism and
 takeover by stealth- what's the difference?, STRAITS TIMES ONLINE, May 29, 2009; A different
 opinion of secular humanism, STRAITS TIMES ONLINE, May 29, 2009; Nominated Member of
 Parliament Thio Li-ann's speech in Sing., Parliamentary Debates , vol. 86 (May 26, 2009).
 32. The bishop of the Anglican church noted that there was a need for "appropriate rules of
 engagement and language of discourse" in a multi-religious society, and the pulpit was not to be
 used to organize and drive the process of change in a civil society group, even though individual
 Christians could contribute in any matter of social concern, and churches could be involved in
 public square discourses "within the rules of engagement in a multi-religious society"
 (; Questionable takeover but crucial service, THE STRAITS TIMES, May 15, 2009).
 33. A vote of no confidence was secured against this committee at a subsequent extraordinary
 general meeting {New guard ousted , THE STRAITS TIMES, May 3, 2009).
 34. This agenda included AWARE' s sexuality education program offered in schools, which
 the Ministry of Education suspended {Sexuality 101, THE STRAITS TIMES, May 10, 2009). The
 episode will have to be the subject of another article.
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 domain, but also to secular groups wishing to push for their norms.35
 The government noted that religious individuals had the same rights as
 other Singaporeans to express their views on public policy issues, but
 had to be mindful of the fact that others had different views in a multi-
 religious society. For Singaporean society, there would be cause for
 concern if religious groups campaigned to change government policies,
 or used the pulpit to mobilize followers to pressure the government, or
 pushed aggressively to gain ground at the expense of other groups; in
 particular, "(k)eeping religion and politics separate is a key rule of
 political engagement."36 In the context of public decisions and laws:
 Our laws and policies do not derive from religious authority, but
 reflect the judgments and decisions of the secular Government and
 Parliament to serve the national interest and collective good.
 These laws and public policies apply equally to all, regardless of
 one's race, religion or social status. This gives confidence that the
 system will give equal treatment and protection for all, regardless
 of which group one happens to belong to.37
 The government's stance, endorsed by leaders of various religions who
 were interviewed,38 remained essentially constant. The government
 showed its intent to step forward and remind citizens to adhere to the
 ground rules for discourse. The episode, far from clarifying the role of
 religion in the public square, though, highlights the tension between
 allowing the expression of religious views, on the one hand, and the
 need for sensitivity and decisions not dictated by any religion, on the
 other hand. If governmental decisions must serve "national interest and
 collective good" and do not "derive from religious authority," religious
 perspectives may, in the final analysis, have little practical impact.
 B. Comparison with Rawls' s Approach to Religion in the Public
 Square
 The Singapore government's approach of sensitivity to differences
 and neutrality in decision-making (while allowing the airing of religious
 views) shares common ground with Rawls' s view that public decisions
 should be grounded in public reason and political values. Both
 approaches seek to negotiate intractable differences resulting from
 35. Sing., Parliamentary Debates , vol. 86 (May 18, 2009). See also 3 recent events show
 importance of harmony, THE STRAITS TIMES, May 19, 2009.
 36. Religious groups must be mindful of differing views, says DPM, and Exercise restraint,
 mutual respect, tolerance , THE STRAITS TIMES, May 15, 2009.
 37. Exercise restraint, mutual respect, tolerance , THE STRAITS TIMES, May 15, 2009.
 38. Religious heads welcome Govt's position , THE STRAITS TIMES, May 15, 2009.
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 comprehensive doctrines and ensure that citizens do not have values
 unreasonably imposed upon them.
 1 . Public Reason as the Basis for Legitimate Law
 In his work, Rawls formulates "the idea of public reason" to deal
 with public decisions in the context of the plurality of conflicting
 reasonable comprehensive doctrines (often also associated with religion)
 that is a normal social result of free institutions.39 Given our
 disagreements due to different comprehensive doctrines we endorse,
 Rawls aims to answer the question of what reasons we may properly
 give one another when fundamental political questions are at stake. The
 Singapore government's approach is similar to Rawls's approach in its
 sensitivity toward not imposing views on groups that do not agree with
 them, even though no reference was made to Rawls.
 Rawls would agree with the Singapore government that the basis of
 public decisions and laws must not be religious authority. According to
 Rawls, religious arguments are not rejected just because they are
 religious arguments, nor are secular arguments privileged.40 Rawls
 notes that people who believe that questions must be decided by best
 reasons according to their idea of the whole truth,41 whether secular or
 religious, reject his idea of public reason. Such insistence is
 incompatible with democratic citizenship and the idea of legitimate law.
 Public reason is also not equivalent to secular reason, which is reasoning
 in terms of comprehensive non-religious doctrines, and is to be viewed
 the same way as religious doctrines.42
 In law-making, the idea of the politically reasonable which is
 addressed to citizens qua citizens replaces comprehensive doctrines of
 truth or right.43 Citizens are reasonable when they view one another as
 free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations.
 Citizens must offer one another fair terms of cooperation, according to
 what they consider the most reasonable conception of political justice.
 They must agree to act on those terms even at the cost of their own
 interests in particular situations, provided that other citizens also accept
 those terms.44 Reciprocity amongst free and equal citizens require that
 terms are proposed as most reasonable for fair cooperation; even though
 39. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 1 1 , at 1 3 1 .
 40. Id. at 143-44.
 41. Id. at 132-33.
 42. Id. at 148.
 43. Id. at 132.
 44. Id. at 136.
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 citizens differ on what is "most reasonable," those proposing must think
 it at least reasonable for others as free and equal citizens to accept them,
 and not as dominated or manipulated or under the pressure of an inferior
 political or social position. Law enacted in conformity with public
 reason as expressed by the majority is legitimate law.45
 2. Political Values Over Religious or Comprehensive Perspectives
 Legitimate law-making relies on political values, which are
 intrinsically moral yet within the category of the political. The three
 features of the political are these:
 a) The principles apply to basic political and social institutions;
 b) They can be presented independently of comprehensive
 doctrines though they are supported by an overlapping consensus
 of different comprehensive doctrines;
 c) They are worked out from fundamental ideas seen as implicit in
 the public conceptions of citizens as free and equal and society as
 a fair system of cooperation.
 Comprehensive doctrines can be introduced provided that in due course
 properly public reasons are given.46 By such reasons, Rawls referred to
 values such as justice, domestic tranquility, common defense, general
 welfare and liberty. The focus of the Singapore government is on
 "national interest and collective good," similar to Rawls' s delineation of
 the sphere of the political.
 Practically speaking, the reliance on political values renders any
 reference to religious perspectives nugatory. Religious perspectives
 have no role in the public square (whether by Rawls's or the Singapore
 government's approach) insofar as they cannot be framed in the form of
 values of national interest or the collective good. Religious or non-
 religious citizens may speak up, and all are held to the same standard,
 but delineation of the political or the "collective good" inherently
 disadvantages the religious citizen: As long as an issue can be classified
 as metaphysical, rather than political, the considerations of the religious
 citizen are irrelevant. From the religious point of view, religious or
 metaphysical questions may be settled in the political sphere by a form
 of reasoning opposed to religion. As will be argued later, this appeared
 to have happened in the parliamentary debates in Singapore.
 45. M at 136-37 and 169.
 46. M at 143-44.
 5 1 6 JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION [Vol. XXVI
 The fact that the delineation of the political lends to a rejection of
 religious perspectives may be seen in Rawls' s critique of rationalist
 believers with a comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine who
 contend that their beliefs can be established by reason. He opines they
 deny the fact of reasonable pluralism.47 This is unduly dismissive of the
 possibility of truth claims, as one cannot conclude that such beliefs
 cannot be established by reason unless one examines their merits.48
 Finnis's critique of Rawls along this line is a lesson for the Singapore
 government. While no similar general rejection of truth claims of
 rationalist believers was made by the Singapore government, the
 dismissive treatment of religion in the parliamentary debates was akin to
 Rawls's approach towards rationalist believers.
 Underlying these approaches is the view that dialogue respectfully
 with every citizen solves the problem of making public decisions on
 issues in relation to which there are intractable differences, whilst
 avoiding an insistence on the whole truth. In the AWARE conflict, the
 Singapore government called for restraint, mutual respect and tolerance.
 Restraint presumably played out in the discussions not insisting on the
 whole truth. This is unhelpful in practice, for a process that respects
 another citizen as a human being with dignity and tolerance of his
 different views does not mean an outcome that is substantively
 acceptable to all citizens may be arrived at.
 Rawls emphasizes the reciprocity amongst free and equal citizens
 and each citizen proposing what is reasonable for another to accept. But
 unless Rawls means to resort to numerical majorities to test what is
 reasonable or not, the "reasonable" must refer to a standard, external to
 the citizens involved in the public decision-making, by which citizens'
 views can be tested for legitimacy.49 How is such a standard different
 from an objective standard in the natural law tradition - a tradition not
 accepted by Rawls?
 Finnis points out that what Rawls refers to as public reason may
 not be dissimilar to what Aquinas propounds as practical reason.50
 Practical reason is employed in the public realm of law and government,
 as contrasted with associations such as family and the church. Law-
 makers and voters are entitled to impose as requirements of public good
 47. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 152-53 (Colum. Univ. Press 1993, 1996)
 [hereinafter Rawls, Political Liberalism],
 48. Finnis, Seegers Lecture: Public Reason, Abortion , and Cloning , 32 VAL. U. L. Rev. 361,
 365 (1998).
 49. Id.
 50. Id. at 363-64.
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 only those practical principles accessible to all people, whatever their
 religious beliefs.51 The difference between Rawls and Aquinas is that
 Rawls does not have an elaborate conception of human nature nor does
 he affirm the epistemology of arriving at universal principles via
 practical reason. Rawls focuses on regulating the process of decision-
 making, rather than testing decisions by substantive principles. In his
 first work, Rawls constructs an "original position" in order to "set up a
 fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just."52 He then
 sets up certain conditions of the original position and places people
 behind a "veil of ignorance" to determine principles of justice to govern
 a political society.53 To the extent that Rawls' s reliance on the
 "reasonable" is problematic, the Singapore government's valuing of
 mutual respect and tolerance is similarly problematic.
 Apart from Rawls, other theorists, such as Robert Audi,54 Kent
 Greenawalt,55 and Stephen Macedo56 have considered the extent to
 which law-making power must be backed by reasons that reasonable
 people should be able to accept and affirm publicly before one another.57
 Macedo, for example, thinks that in accepting reasonable pluralism and
 trying to discern principles that can be accepted by individuals
 committed to different ways of life, citizens honor "a duty of civility to
 one another."58 As will be argued, restraint, mutual respect and
 tolerance are worthy values, but the emphasis on civility sidelines
 metaphysical questions out of a fear of the intractability of religious
 arguments. And further, as will be argued in relation to the abortion
 discourse, without addressing metaphysical questions, the process fails
 to produce a satisfactory solution that gives adequate weight to all the
 pertinent issues.
 II . Religion and Reason in Singapore ' s Abortion Debate
 I begin with a description of the abortion laws in Singapore which
 51. Id. at 364.
 52. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 136 (Belknap Press Harv. Univ. Press 1971).
 53. Id. at 12.
 54. Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge Univ.
 Press 2000).
 55. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (Oxford Univ.
 Press 1988).
 56. Stephen Macedo, In defense of liberal public reason: Are slavery and abortion hard
 cases?, 42 Am. J. JURIS. 1, 11 (1997) [hereinafter Macedo, In defense]. He considers Rawls's
 political liberalism as characterized by excessive reticence.
 57. Id. at 2, 6.
 58. Id. at 13.
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 resulted from the parliamentary debates in question. With these laws in
 view, I critique the parliamentary debates of 1969 ("1969 debates") that
 led to the 1969 Act, and of 1974 ("1974 debates") that led to the 1974
 Act. I suggest that the government's approach is similar to Rawls 's,
 avoiding metaphysical questions by a delineation of the political, with
 the result that metaphysical questions were in effect decided even as
 religious (metaphysical) arguments were sidelined. I argue that the
 abortion discourse in Singapore showcases the fact that in multi-
 religious democracies, it is sometimes impossible to make public
 decisions which truly respects every citizen's view. The implications of
 this will be addressed in the concluding Part.
 A. The Law on Abortion in Singapore59
 Generally, subject to the Termination of Pregnancy Act (TP A), any
 person who causes a woman to miscarry (including the woman herself)
 or intentionally brings about the death of the child immediately before or
 after birth is subject to criminal liability under the Penal Code.60
 Abortions legally done must be sanctioned by the TPA. Under sections
 3 and 10 of the TPA, with the exception of abortion through drugs
 prescribed by an authorized medical practitioner which does not involve
 any surgical operation or procedure,61 only an authorized medical
 practitioner in an approved institution may act on the request of a
 pregnant woman and with her written consent to terminate her
 59. For a helpful reference, see Ho Peng Kee, Abortion in Singapore: A Legal Perspective , 42
 I.C.L.Q. 382 (1993).
 60. Cap. 224, Sing. Stat., 1985 Rev. Ed., § 315. The relevant provisions in Singapore are as
 follows: Under § 312 of the Penal Code, subject to the TPA, any person (including the pregnant
 woman herself) who voluntarily causes a woman with child to miscarry is liable to be punished by
 imprisonment for a term of up to three years, or with fine, or with both. Imprisonment may extend
 to seven years if the woman is "quick with child." Under § 313, if miscarriage is caused without
 the consent of the woman, the term may be for life or extend to 10 years. Under § 315, for an
 intentional act causing a child to die before or immediately after birth, in a case in which the child
 is capable of being born alive, the offender is liable to imprisonment for up to 10 years or a fine or
 both, unless such act is immediately necessary to save the life of the mother, and subject to the
 provisions of the TPA. The child is presumed to be capable of being born alive if the woman is in
 the 28th week of pregnancy. These may be compared with the provisions dealing with the death
 of the mother or an act amounting to culpable homicide if it had caused death. Under § 3 14, if the
 intended act of miscarriage causes the death of the woman, the imprisonment may extend to 10
 years, or if the act is without the consent of the woman, the term may be for life or extend to 10
 years. Under § 316, a person who knowing that it is likely to cause the death of a pregnant
 woman, does an act which, if it caused the death of the woman, would amount to culpable
 homicide, in a case when the quick unborn child dies but the woman does not die, is liable to
 imprisonment of up to ten years and fine. Notably, the latter section refers to the "death" of the
 quick unborn child.
 61. Cap. 324, §10.
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 pregnancy. With the exception of treatment necessary to save the life of
 the woman, the woman must also fulfill certain requirements of
 citizenship or residency or the like.62 Up to the sixteenth week of
 pregnancy, abortion is available without restriction as to reason.63 When
 the pregnancy is more than sixteen weeks but less than twenty-four
 weeks in duration, the restriction pertains to the qualifications of the
 authorized medical practitioner.64 Beyond the twenty-fourth week,
 treatment is only permitted when it is immediately necessary to save the
 life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health
 of the pregnant woman.65 An exemption from participating in any
 treatment to terminate pregnancy on the ground of conscientious
 objection is granted, save when a person has a duty to participate in such
 treatment which is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent
 grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of a pregnant
 woman.66 Confidentiality of medical records and the fact that abortion
 has been performed is also ensured.67
 The TPA also authorizes the Minister to make regulations
 pertaining to the Act, including prescription of the form of consent to be
 given by a pregnant woman undergoing such treatment.68 Under the
 Termination of Pregnancy Regulations ("TPR"), counseling is
 mandatory for women seeking to terminate their pregnancies.69 Special
 requirements apply to unmarried pregnant women below the age of
 sixteen years.70 Also, forty-eight hours must elapse after counseling
 before a woman gives written consent to the treatment and the treatment
 is given.71
 The TPA is a consolidation of the statutes on abortion in the 1985
 Revised Edition of the Singapore Statutes. It is substantially the same as
 the Abortion Act of 1974 ("1974 Act")72 save for some amendments in
 1980.73 The 1974 Act, by allowing the decision to terminate pregnancy
 to rest solely with the woman, radically liberalized abortion as compared
 62. § 3(3), amended by the Employment of Foreign Workers (Amendment) Act 2007 (No. 30
 of 2007, Sing.).
 63. Implied from § 4(1).
 64. § 4(l)(b).




 69. Termination of Pregnancy Regulations, 1999 Rev. Ed. Sing., Rule 5.
 70. Rule 5(2).
 71. Rule 6.
 72. No. 24 of 74.
 73. No. 32 of 80.
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 with the already controversial Abortion Act of 1969 ("1969 Act"),
 which had been extensively debated in Parliament. The 1969 Act was to
 continue in force for four years only, although the Minister was
 empowered to extend it for a further year, after which, according to the
 Explanatory Statement, "a critical assessment can be made as to the
 effectiveness of the legislation and consideration can be given by
 Parliament as to the desirability of continuing the legislation." Under
 the 1969 Act, a pregnancy might be terminated by a registered medical
 practitioner acting under an authorization granted by the Termination of
 Pregnancy Authorization Board, which might authorize treatment to
 terminate pregnancy if it was found in good faith, that one of four
 grounds existed:
 (a) the continuation of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life
 of the pregnant woman or injury to the physical or mental
 health74 of the pregnant woman (up to 24 weeks unless such
 treatment was immediately necessary to save the life or to
 prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health
 of the pregnant woman);
 (b) the environment (including family and financial
 circumstances) of the pregnant woman, both at the time when
 the child would be born and thereafter so far as was
 foreseeable, justified the termination of her pregnancy (up to 16
 weeks of pregnancy);
 (c) there was substantial risk that if the child were born, it would
 suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be
 seriously handicapped (up to 24 weeks unless such treatment
 was immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave
 permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the
 pregnant woman); or
 (d) the pregnancy was the result of rape under section 375 of the
 Penal Code or of incest under section 376 A of the Penal Code
 or of intercourse with an insane or feeble-minded person (up to
 16 weeks of pregnancy).75
 74. In the Second Reading of the Bill, Mr. Chua Sian Chin said that this ground redressed
 legal ambiguities rather than substantially changed existing law: Abortion Bill 1968 , Second
 Reading, supra note 1, cols. 861-62. Prior to the statute, the law specifically recognized as the
 only ground of abortion that was for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, but this had been
 interpreted to allow physicians to preserve the woman's physical and mental health. But
 physicians might have been concerned about the risk of criminal liability even when the woman's
 health was endangered and specific enunciation through the statute redressed this.
 75. Cap. 324, § 5(2) read with § 6.
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 The law also contained an option for two registered medical
 practitioners to act in consultation without the Board under certain
 conditions.76 An exception was made in the case where treatment was
 immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent
 injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.77 Where
 the applicant was below eighteen years of age, consent of the parents or
 guardian was also required.78 The 1969 Act amended the law which had
 hitherto allowed a registered medical practitioner to lawfully carry out
 abortion "only on purely medical grounds to save the life of the
 mother."79 The check of the authorization of the Board,80 the grounds of
 abortion, and the requirement of parental consent were removed by the
 enactment of the 1974 Act,81 which was consolidated in the TPA.
 Singapore's legalization of abortion up to twenty-four weeks
 without restriction as to reason and with only the requirement that the
 medical practitioner be qualified is one of the most liberal in the world.
 Indeed, Mr. Chua noted in the Third Reading of the 1969 Bill:
 The passing of this Bill indeed marks a historic milestone in the
 development and progress of our Republic. This Abortion Bill,
 which will allow abortions on purely socio-economic grounds
 under its environmental clause, can indeed be considered one of
 the most progressive pieces of social legislation ever to be adopted
 in the non-Communist world.82
 As Singapore's law is not unusual, an examination of the discourse
 which led to its law holds lessons for other jurisdictions.
 B. Examining the Nature of Reasons in Singapore's Debate
 The reasons given for allowing abortion in Singapore may be
 classified under four categories: the widespread practice of illegal
 abortions; medical considerations; social goods; and the denial of moral




 79. Explanatory Statement, Abortion Bill 1968, No. 40 of 68.
 80. The delay occasioned by the need to go before the Board was a reason for the change in
 the law. See Sing., Parliamentary Debates , vol. 33, col. 1 109 (Nov. 6, 1974). The debates during
 the Second and Third Readings of the 1974 Bill will subsequently be referred to as the " Abortion
 Bill 1974 Debates."
 8 1 . After the debates during the Second Reading, the House resolved itself into a Committee
 on the Bill, which was considered in the Committee, reported without amendment, read a third
 time, and passed: Abortion Bill 1974 Debates, id. at col. 1 137.
 82. Abortion Bill 1968 , Third Reading, supra note 9, col. 293.
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 categories were viewed as not implicating what I shall refer to as "the
 metaphysical question" of when life began and the worth of the life of
 the unborn - a question which some religions purport to answer.
 1 . W idespread Practice
 In proposing changes to abortion regulation, Mr. Chua suggested
 that the widespread incidence of criminal abortions suggested the
 ineffectiveness of the law, which was also not in line with the general
 approval of the community towards abortion.83 He noted that the
 prohibition also had a discriminatory effect, as the rich could obtain
 abortions whereas the poor were left to dangerous back-street
 abortions.84
 The political comeback of his opponents was two-fold in publicly
 accessible terms. First, there had not been a public clamor for new
 abortion laws and there were strong public reactions to the proposed
 law.85 Second, the danger of back-alley abortions did not justify the
 legalization of abortion, as in all other activities, there was no suggestion
 that any dignified profession should take over a particular criminal
 activity because they did the job better.86 Thus, the questions of whether
 and when abortion should be allowed must be resolved by consideration
 of other factors, and not by reference to the existence of back-alley
 practices. "Other factors" must include the metaphysical question. If
 the unborn was a human life, a dignified profession ought not to aid in
 killing.
 2. Medical Considerations
 Mr. Chua argued that considerations governing the regulation of
 abortion ought to be medical: the viability of the fetus and the danger of
 the operation to the mother.87 The laws would be framed to take into
 account any danger to the health and life of the woman.88 In case
 women were tempted to have repeated abortions, the Voluntary
 Sterilization Bill was introduced concurrently.89 Mr. Chua also cited
 83. Abortion Bill 1968 , Second Reading, supra note 1, col. 866.
 84. Id. at col. 867.
 85. See , e.g., id. at cols. 893 & 978.
 86. Id. at cols. 898-99. In any case, during the Second Reading of the Abortion Bill 1974 , it
 was suggested that the objective of reduction in the number of illegal abortions was not reached:
 Abortion Bill 1974 Debates, supra note 80, col. 1 106.
 87. Abortion Bill 1968, Second Reading, supra note 1, col. 877.
 88. Id. at cols. 881-82.
 89. M at col. 882.
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 studies rejecting the suggestion that women who had undergone
 abortions suffered greater undesirable psychic and physical reactions,90
 and put aside objections of some doctors cited by other
 parliamentarians .9 1
 Yet, if the considerations were medical, with medical technology
 enabling earlier viability of the fetus,92 and results of more recent studies
 on the danger to the health of the mother,93 a review of these
 assumptions was overdue. Moreover, the relevance of fetal viability had
 been contested,94 and with increased jurisprudential writings questioning
 the relevance of viability, the decision to link the period during which
 abortion without restriction as to reason could be obtained to the concept
 of viability must be reviewed.
 3. Social Goods
 Mr. Chua suggested that a relaxed abortion law was for the "greater
 good for our society" and that it would "help to improve the quality of
 our next generation" if abortion was allowed.95 He focused on what he
 considered to be practical realities and the public good. He suggested
 that arguments offered by the camp opposing legalization were religious
 and not publicly accessible; publicly accessible arguments were in favor
 of allowing abortion. To examine this claim, the nature of the social
 goods of abortion requires some unpacking and the arguments of those
 90. Id. at cols. 882-83. This point was reiterated by the citation of some studies in the debates
 at the Second Reading of the Abortion Bill 1974 : Abortion Bill 1974 Debates, supra note 80, col.
 1105.
 91. Abortion Bill 1968 , Second Reading, supra note 1, cols. 978-79.
 92. Twenty-three weeks. See generally , "Abortion Time Limits," British Medical
 Association (May 2008), http://www.bma.org.uk/ethics/reproduction_genetics/
 Abortiontimelimit.jsp; and for a specific example: "Premature baby to stay for checks," BBC
 NEWS Feb. 20, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/americas/6377639.stm.
 93. See, e.g., Coalition on Abortion/Breast Cancer, http://www.abortionbreastcancer.com
 (last visited Mar. 18, 2011); contrast "Abortion and breast cancer: There is no link," Feminist
 Women's Health Center (Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.fvvhc.org/ abortion/abcancer.htm.
 94. See, e.g., Alan Zaitchik, Viability and the morality of abortion , 10 (1) PHIL. & PUB.
 AFFAIRS 18 (1981); Donald Hope, The hand as emblem of human identity : A solution to the
 abortion controversy based on science and reason , 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 205; PETER KREEFT, THE
 UNABORTED Socrates 61-62 (IVP 1983); cf Katherine С. Sheehan, The Hand that Rocks the
 Cradle , 32 U. TOL. L. Rev. 229, 246-47. Indeed, other criteria offered as indicative of when life
 begins or becomes worthy of protection have also been contested. See, e.g., the idea of
 quickening: Charles I. Lugosi, When Abortion was a crime: A historical perspective , 83 U. DET.
 MERCY L. rev. 51 (2006); the zygote: Т.Н. Milby, The new biology and the question of
 personhood: Implications for abortion , 9 Am. J.L. & MED. 31, 40 (1983-84); cortical brain
 activity: MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMANS RIGHTS 58 (Cambridge Univ. Press
 2006).
 95. Abortion Bill 1968 , Second Reading, supra note 1, cols. 890-91.
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 opposing legalization must be examined. On examination, just as
 arguments opposing legalization were premised on an answer to the
 metaphysical question about the worth of the unborn, so were arguments
 for legalizing abortion.
 The first alleged social good of liberal abortion laws was the
 quality of life of each child born as the child would be wanted and have
 a better life. This was also good for the society because, as Mr. Chua
 noted: "[I]t is mainly from the ranks of the unwanted children, the
 illegitimate and broken homes where most of the delinquents, the
 criminals and the antisocial elements are derived. Our society in
 Singapore cannot afford to breed such people."96 It was, however,
 pointed out that the slogan "every child a wanted child" smacked of a
 "crazy logic" as it was based on "the right of the child to be a wanted
 child" and yet abortion deprived the child of the "right to live"
 altogether.97 Alternatives such as adoption98 or helping the mother learn
 to want the unwelcome pregnancy99 should be considered. If infertility
 problems suffered by married couples today were more severe, and if
 attitudes to adoption had changed, adoption programs might be more
 welcome today, and a review of legislation might meaningfully be called
 for. More significantly, arguments for and against abortion on the
 ground of the quality of life of the child made sense only if the
 metaphysical question of the worth of the life of the unborn was settled.
 The metaphysical question should thus not have been sidelined, even if
 the arguments on the metaphysical question were necessarily religious.
 The second alleged social good was that the net quality of the
 population would be improved if the mentally and physically
 handicapped might be aborted. The eugenics ground for abortion,
 however, had been criticized as opening the way "for a future
 government to argue that it is justifiable to legislate for the destruction
 of deformed babies, of the mentally defective, of the incurably ill, of the
 old and the sick and the economically worthless."100 Moreover, if
 fetuses were aborted on suspected abnormalities, and the only concern
 was the eradication of the deformed, one parliamentarian snidely but
 perspicaciously pointed out that it was far better to wait for fetuses to
 attain their full growth and then commit infanticide at the time when the
 96. Id. at col. 874.
 97. Id. at col. 895 (Mr. Ng Kah Ting).
 98. Id. at col. 895.
 99. Id. at col. 974.
 100. Id. at cols. 897-98. See also the views of Mr. Sia Khoon Seong (at col. 973) and Mr. Ho
 See Beng (at col. 1027).
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 deformity was not just a risk but had been confirmed at birth.101 Mr.
 Chua dismissed the slippery slope argument as a "mischievous" one by
 suggesting that "[n]o community anywhere in the present world,
 irrespective of its political character, has ever thought of permitting the
 killing of human beings, as it is generally understood, be they sick, old,
 infirm, paralysed or totally decrepit."102 Academics such as Peter Singer
 have since propounded views which might require Mr. Chua to re-
 examine his position.103 If, indeed, the community in the present world
 four decades later took quite a different view from that in mid-century,
 then review of any legislation impinging on the right to life would be
 called for. Also, the eugenics ground is likely to be unacceptable today.
 The arguments were premised on metaphysical questions about the
 worth of lives of the disabled, and these questions could not be sidelined
 just by reframing the debate as one over social goods.
 The third alleged social good was that population explosion
 problems would be controlled. In rebuttal, one parliamentarian,
 however, pointed out that if indeed the government did not want to
 promote abortion on demand, then other methods of family planning
 should be encouraged104 and would already have achieved the desired
 population control. If, however, availability of abortion was expected to
 make a difference to the overall population, the government must be
 expecting other methods of family planning to have failed or to be
 forsaken, in which case the worst fears of abortion on demand would
 have been realized.105 Couples who once cared about family planning
 would no longer worry about other measures of contraception,106 though
 pro-choice advocates suggested that the unpleasantness and relative
 expense would mean that people would still prefer contraception.107
 Additionally, Mr. Chua noted there was a safeguard to prevent repeated
 abortions, as a woman who sought an abortion and who already had
 three or more children would be permitted to abort provided she agreed
 to subsequent sterilization.108 In any case, one parliamentarian's words
 about under-population being a concern turned out to be prophetic,109 as
 the Singapore government has recently been concerned not with
 101. Id. at col. 1021 (Mr. Conceicao).
 102. Id. at col. 1040.
 103. Peter Singer, Sanctity of life or quality of life?, 72(1) PEDIATRICS 128 (1983).
 104. Abortion Bill 1968 , Second Reading, supra note 1, col. 1035.
 105. Id. at cols. 980-81.
 106. M at col. 954.
 107. M at col. 956.
 108. Id. at col. 1043.
 109. Id. at cols. 981-82.
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 population explosion but decreasing birth rates,110 rendering review
 overdue even if the reason was valid to begin with. Moreover, again, the
 opinion that population explosion could be curbed by abortion must be
 premised on the morality of abortion, as few would entertain infanticide
 as a means of population control. Thus, it must have resolved the
 metaphysical question about the worth of the unborn.
 4. Denial of Ethical and Moral Reasons against Allowing Abortion
 Mr. Chua dismissed ethical, moral and social reasons against laws
 allowing abortion. He did not agree that allowing abortions reduced
 respect for the sanctity of life, or that it resulted in a degrading of
 character or problems of promiscuity or lack of responsibility.111
 Another parliamentarian later cited a steady increase in the number of
 unmarried women seeking abortions between the inception of the 1969
 Act and the Second Reading for the Abortion Bill of 1974. 112 Although
 such an increase did not in itself conclusively suggest that legalization of
 abortion caused promiscuity, the issue of whether allowing abortions
 showed disrespect for the sanctity of life depended on the answer to the
 metaphysical question about the worth of the unborn. Mr. Chua could
 not have been making a purely sociological dissociation between
 legalizing abortions and reduced respect. His argument would be most
 persuasive if abortions did not destroy life, and must thus be premised
 upon a rejection of the sanctity of the unborn' s life. Indeed, he
 dismissed the opposition of minority groups on religious and ethical
 grounds which he said were "highly theoretical and emotional, of divine
 creation and the sanctity of the fertilized ovum or the foetus which is
 quite different from a living person." He regarded these arguments to be
 "entirely futile and to ignore completely the realities of the modern
 world and its problems" and invited the minority groups to visit the
 Woodbridge Hospital and view the mental defectives, suggesting that
 they would begin to "question the very purpose of the Divine creating
 such mental defectives."113
 110. See, e.g., Kudos to women, but low birth rate worries PM , ASIAOneNEWS, Aug. 5, 2009,
 http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Singapore/Story/AlStory20090805-159177.
 html.
 111. Abortion Bill 1968 , Second Reading, supra note 1, cols. 878-79. Contrast the views of
 Inche Rahmat bin Kenap (cols. 972-73) and Mr. Sia Khoon Seong (col. 975).
 112. Abortion Bill 1974 Debates, supra note 80, col. 1115 (Mr. Ivan Baptist).
 113. Abortion Bill 1968 , Second Reading, supra note 1, col. 864. Woodbridge Hospital was a
 mental institution.
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 The legislature's avoidance of the metaphysical question might
 have stemmed from a fear of intractable differences, given that different
 religions had different answers to offer on metaphysical questions.114
 Mr. Chua suggested that persons who believed abortion to be wrong
 simply refrain from going for an abortion, but claimed that they should
 not impose their values on others.115 No one was forced to undergo or
 perform an abortion.116 Concerns of pro-lifers should be accommodated
 within the framework of each woman's choice,117 leaving each to settle
 the metaphysical question for herself.
 Rawls has, similarly, opined that Catholics who fail to win a
 majority "need not themselves exercise the right to abortion" but "can
 recognize the right as belonging to legitimate law enacted in accordance
 with legitimate political institutions and public reason, and therefore not
 resist it with force." Rawls views forceful resistance by Catholics to
 abortion as an "attempting] to impose by force their own
 comprehensive doctrine that a majority of other citizens who follow
 public reason, not unreasonably, do not accept."118
 This position contrasts with Rawls's view in his earlier work,
 Political Liberalism, in which he said in a footnote that in the case of
 mature adult women, "any comprehensive doctrine that leads to a
 balance of political values excluding that qualified right in the first
 trimester (to decide whether or not to end her pregnancy) is to that
 extent unreasonable; and depending on details of its formulation, it may
 also be cruel and oppressive; for example, if it denied the right
 1 14. Indeed, a parliamentarian's citation of Biblical passages in another sitting was brushed
 aside by Mr. Chua, who said he did not consider these passages to be authorities. Psalm 139 and
 Jeremiah 1 were cited by Dr. Augustine H.H. Tan in the second Reading of the Abortion
 (Amendment) Bill 1980. See Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 39, cols. 1553, 1554 respectively
 (Nov. 28, 1980).
 115. See, e.g., Abortion Bill 1974 Debates, supra note 80, col. 1 100 (Mr. Chua Sian Chin).
 116. Abortion Bill 1968, Second Reading, supra note 1, cols. 877-78.
 117. Unlike debates in the West where much had since been said about the right of the woman
 to control her own body, autonomy of women did not feature as much, even though one
 parliamentarian referred to the new regulations as necessary for the "full emancipation of our
 women." Id. at col. 984 (Mr. Yong Nyuk Lin). Mr. Chua in the Third Reading also referred to
 the main purpose of the Bill as being to "liberate our women from the tyranny of unwanted
 pregnancies" (and to ensure that each child was a wanted child): Abortion Bill 1968, Third
 Reading, supra note 9, col. 341.
 While the right of women was spoken for outside of the situations of life and health
 {Abortion Bill 1968, Second Reading, supra note 1, col. 864), a female parliamentarian objected to
 male parliamentarians purporting to speak for women by suggesting that abortion did not involve
 suffering, noting that many women who went for abortions were the less well off who lacked
 nourishment necessary after such procedures ( Abortion Bill 1968, Third Reading, supra note 9,
 cols. 335-36).
 118. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 1 1 , at 1 70.
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 altogether except in the case of rape and incest." In the earlier work,
 Rawls noted that to vote from a comprehensive doctrine that denied this
 right was to go against the ideal of public reason, even though the
 doctrine might be reasonable most of the time.119 He reasoned from the
 point of view of three political values when he concluded that the
 woman has the qualified right: the due respect for human life, the
 ordered reproduction of society over time, including the family in some
 form, and the equality of women as equal citizens. In his updated thesis
 on public reason,120 Rawls does not assess the comparative
 reasonableness of the arguments cast in the form of public reason for or
 against the right of abortion, though he acknowledges that arguments
 made for denying the right of abortion on the ground of political values
 of "public peace, essential protections of human rights, and the
 commonly accepted standards of moral behavior in a community of law"
 are such arguments.121
 Rawls' s position is slightly more elaborate on the justification of
 the right to abort than Mr. Chua's: Even in his earlier work where he
 cursorily dismissed the arguments of those who opposed a right to abort,
 Rawls recognized the need to argue for the woman's right to choose by
 reference to their autonomy, as balanced against other values. But
 Finnis, in reply, suggests that the idea that Catholics need not exercise
 the right does not address the issue of legitimate law. He likens abortion
 laws to the laws of South Carolina in 1859, 122 which compelled no white
 man to own slaves yet would be unacceptable today and seen as "pro-
 slavery" rather than "pro-choice."123
 Further, Rawls surely does not mean to equate public reason with
 majority views, and if so, he must explain why the vote of citizens for
 the right of abortion is not unreasonable. Rawls has referred only to an
 article by Judith Jarvis Thomson. Finnis notes that this article does not
 adequately give a reasonable status to pro-abortion views as Thomson
 merely suggests that restrictive regulation of abortion severely
 constrains women's liberty, and such constraints may not be imposed in
 the name of considerations that the constrained are not unreasonable in
 119. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 47, at 243-44, n. 32.
 120. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 1 1 , at 1 69, n. 80.
 121. Id. at 170, n. 82.
 122. Finnis, Abortion, Natural Law and Public Reason, in NATURAL LAW AND PUBLIC
 REASON 75, 89 (Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe eds., Georgetown Univ. Press 2000).
 [hereinafter Finnis, Abortion and Public Reason],
 123. Francis Cardinal George, Law and Culture, 1 Ave Maria L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (2003). See
 also Francis J. Beckwith, Thomson's "equal reasonableness" argument for abortion rights: A
 critique, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 185 (2004).
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 rejecting. Finnis notes that she asserts that many women who reject the
 claim that the fetus has a right to life from the moment of conception are
 not unreasonable in doing so. This is a bald assertion and in fact
 unreasonable when no attempt is made to show how the unborn is
 different from the newborn, and why the newborn has rights which the
 unborn does not have.124
 Legal systems are not silent on abortion, for silence is seen as
 lending to controversy and doctors would be afraid of performing
 abortions only to be sued or prosecuted subsequently. Laws regulate
 abortion by allowing abortion in certain circumstances. Underlying the
 framework of choice is the view that values are subjective (or if
 objective, are not conclusively discoverable anyway), and religious
 persons should not impose their values derived from their religion on the
 rest of society which does not similarly value the life of the unborn. A
 common opinion is that this "laissez faire"125 approach to abortion does
 not resolve "the difficult question of when life begins"126 and impose on
 the religious. Mr. Chua said: "The problem is not whether the foetus is
 inchoate and hence expendable as the law reformers claim, or whether it
 is human and inviolable as the opponents insist. The central problem is
 that of an unwanted pregnancy and how to treat it."127
 Yet, this settles the metaphysical question of the worth of the
 unborn. The pregnant woman is not regarded as imposing upon the
 unborn her metaphysical view about its worth by her choice to abort if
 and only if the unborn is not a person. As legal systems do not permit
 murder or the taking of an innocent life, allowing abortion is tantamount
 to concluding that abortion is not the taking of an innocent life, whether
 because the unborn is not a person or because its situation viz. the
 mother is such that the mother is entitled to have it removed.128
 In Singapore, the Select Committee pronounced that it "did not
 think it fit to debate whether the foetus has a right to life or whether it
 should have human rights."129 Mr. Chua suggested it was just a "view-
 point" of the religious that abortion was murder, as "(l)earned men,
 medical or otherwise, for centuries have not been able to agree on
 whether the foetus is human life." Yet, shortly after mentioning such an
 124. Finnis, Abortion, Natural Law and Public Reason , supra note 122, at 88.
 125. Gary D. Glenn, Abortion and inalienable rights in classical liberalism , 20 AM. J. JURIS.
 62,71 (1975).
 126. Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 1 13, 159 (1973).
 127. Abortion Bill 1968, Second Reading, supra note 1, col. 889.
 128. As, for example, was the argument made by Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of
 Abortion , 1 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 47 (1971).
 129. Abortion Bill 1968, Third Reading, supra note 9, col. 340.
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 age-old debate, the Minister went on to pronounce that "[a]n early
 conception is not a human being; it is a potential human being," citing
 the "immense" difference between an early embryo and a living person,
 as the embryo "has no consciousness, no life experience."130 Surely
 these words attempted to settle the metaphysical question which he said
 was irresolvable. Indeed, at the Third Reading of the Bill, Mr. Chua
 said: "[A]s far as I know, from the medical point of view, the foetus is
 not yet a human being, and as such, logically, how can it have human
 rights?"
 Mr. Chua also referred to the treatment of the unborn fetus in law,
 and suggested that "no abortionist in any community has been charged
 with murder for the destruction of the foetus."131 He suggested the same
 in parliamentary debates in 1980 when he said: "In my training as a
 lawyer, I have never been taught that, in law, abortion is murder."132 By
 his reference to existing laws, Mr. Chua must have been aware that the
 law settled the metaphysical question of when life began. Further, if the
 very issue was the content of law, and whether it respected life,
 reference to the current state of the law in contention was unhelpful, if
 not spurious.
 The realization that the metaphysical question cannot be avoided
 raises the corollary question of how the metaphysical question may be
 resolved. The next section deals with this.
 C. Can We Eschew Religious Differences in Public Decision-
 Making?
 In relation to abortion, one may say that the burden is on those who
 limit liberty to prove that the unborn is worthy of protection, and
 abortion should be allowed as long as this burden is not discharged. Not
 erring on the side of preserving life, however, is counter-intuitive from a
 moral point of view. If a hunter senses movement behind a bush and
 shoots at it without being sure that it is not caused by a human but an
 animal, he would be criticized for moral irresponsibility.133
 The counter-argument is that a definite right of the woman is at
 stake, against an unproven right of the unborn. Some liken pregnancy of
 130. Abortion Bill 1968, Second Reading, supra note 1, col. 876.
 131. Id. at col. 1039.
 132. Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 39, col. 1554 (Nov. 28, 1980).
 133. Harold O.J. Brown, Death Before Birth (Thomas Nelson 1977) cited in John
 Jefferson Davis, Evangelical Ethics: Issues facing the church today 134 (2d ed., P&R
 Pubi' g 1985, 1993).
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 the woman to the forced labor of the slaves,134 even though her
 pregnancy lasts for a term. After all, pregnancy results in severe
 physiological and other changes to the woman. As the plaintiffs
 attorney Sarah Weddington in Roe v. Wade135 said in her first argument
 to the United States Supreme Court, pregnancy "disrupts (the woman's)
 body, it disrupts her education, it disrupts her employment, and it often
 disrupts her entire family life . . ."I36
 134. John M. Swomley, Abortion and public policy , 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 409, 416-17
 (1993-94). The employment of the slavery analogy has not been without criticism. It has been
 noted that most white Americans today would not conceive of themselves owning slaves, and
 likening abortion to slavery appeals to moral certainty on the slavery issue and transposes such
 certainty illegitimately to a controversial issue. See Debora Threedy, Slavery rhetoric and the
 abortion debate , 2 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 3 (1994) and Andrew Koppelman, Forced labor: A
 Thirteenth Amendment defense of abortion , 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 480, 487 (1989-90). As a
 comeback, it may be noted that those who invoke the slavery rhetoric may not be employing it
 metaphorically but may see the nature of the rights at stake as comparable in the cases of abortion
 and slavery.
 135. 410 U.S. 113. In Roe it was held that the woman had the right to make choices as to her
 body without the interference of the state. See also Julia E. Hanisberg, Homologizing pregnancy
 and motherhood: A consideration of abortion , 94 MICH. L. REV. 371 (1995); Eileen L McDonagh,
 My body, my consent: Securing the constitutional right to abortion funding, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1057
 (1998-99). One writer analyzed abortion in terms of property law and considered the relationship
 between the fetus and the woman as one of license: Jeffrey D. Goldberg, Involuntary servitudes: A
 property-based notion of abortion-choice, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1597-1657 (1990-91). Laws may
 restrict the woman's right in various ways: They may punish the abortion provider or less
 commonly, the woman. They may require a 24-hour waiting period (as in City of Akron v. Akron
 Center for Reproductive Health 462 U.S. 416), or parental consent for minors seeking abortions,
 or they may prohibit use of public funds and facilities for abortions. In the United States, anything
 that restricts the privacy right of the woman after Roe must be tested for consistency with it. See
 Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Where privacy fails: Equal protection and the abortion rights of
 minors , 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597 (1993), n. 5, 598, for examples. Since Roe , the United States
 Supreme Court decided in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 that the privacy right
 protected by the due process clause was only infringed when abortion restrictions pre-viability
 placed an undue burden on the woman's constitutional right to decide to terminate a pregnancy.
 In that case, it was held that 'informed consent' requirements, a 24-hour waiting period, the
 provision for parental consent and reporting and record-keeping requirements of the Pennsylvania
 statute did not impose an undue burden, whereas the spousal notification provision did.
 Commentators have critiqued the waiting period as demeaning in suggesting that women make
 rash decisions and as affecting poor people who may have to take more than a day off work, or
 even more if clinics do not open every day. See Sylvia A. Law, Abortion compromise - inevitable
 and impossible , U. ILL. L. REV. 921, 940-41 (1992).
 Judicial activism in finding of such a privacy right have been critiqued; see e.g., Jules B.
 Gerard, Roe v. Wade is constitutionally unprincipled and logically incoherent : A brief in support
 of judicial restraint , 15 AM. J. L. & MED. 222-26 (1989).
 136. Donald Hope, The hand as emblem of human identity : A solution to the abortion
 controversy based on science and reason , 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 205, 206-07 (2001). While some
 feminists have cited the equal protection argument for abortion, others have pointed out that this
 suggests that women may only be equal when they are able to choose not to bear children, which
 perpetuates the view that mothers cannot be truly equal as motherhood interferes with professional
 success. See Kristina M. Mentone, When equal protection fails: How the equal protection
 justification for abortion undercuts the struggle for equality in the workplace , 70 FORDHAM L.
 REV. 2657, 2681-82 (2001-02).
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 Even if pro-lifers had accepted the "burden of proof," pro-lifers
 were left in a Catch-22 in the Singapore debates. A metaphysical
 question about the worth of the unborn had to be resolved by
 metaphysical (often religious) arguments. But Mr. Chua dismissed
 moral and ethical considerations. Various medical codes and
 conferences were cited for the view that life began at conception,137 but
 these and other non-religious opinions against abortion138 were
 dismissed: "[S]ome also attempt to put up a façade of rationality and of
 being scientific by quoting excerpts from some learned medical journals
 in the hope of concealing the fact that their arguments spring from their
 fundamental religious conviction . . ,"139 This left the religious in an
 unenviable position: If they cited religious arguments, they would fail
 Rawls' s test; if they cited non-religious arguments, they would be
 accused of putting up a façade of rationality.
 Mr. Chua's approach was more far-reaching than Rawls's. The test
 for whether arguments could be considered was not the accessibility of
 religious reasons; he objected to all reasons that seemed to be religiously
 motivated.
 As a ground rule for discourse and decision-making in a pluralist
 democracy, asking whether an argument is religiously motivated is
 unacceptable. It is tantamount to rejection of arguments offered by
 anyone who was religious - whether the arguments are publicly
 accessible or not. Further, if everyone with a religion is religiously
 motivated, everyone without a religion is similarly motivated by their
 personal worldview which dismisses religion. To be fair to the citizens
 in a pluralist democracy, the possibility of subjective bias might be
 addressed by allowing no one to participate in discourse in the public
 square, which is a ridiculous position. Alternatively, if one admits only
 the arguments of the non-religious, one excludes the participation of the
 sector of the citizenry which embraces a religion.
 Moreover, it makes no sense to look at religious motivations. The
 relationship between one's worldview and one's particular conclusions
 is often far more complex than that between cause and effect. One's
 worldview may not be the cause of one's particular positions. Rather,
 137. The sources were the International Code of Medical Ethics published by the World
 Medical Association, the International Conference on Abortion held in Harvard in 1967, and a
 professor of Obstetrics and Gynaecology at Leeds University. Abortion Bill 1968 , Second
 Reading, supra note 1, cols. 896-97.
 138. Id. at col. 955 (Mr. Tay Boon Too). Mr. Ho Kah Leong stated specifically (at col. 971)
 that he was a free thinker but took his view about the protection of fetal life based on his
 conscientious rationalization.
 139. Id. at cols. 1037-38. See also Abortion Bill 1968 , Third Reading, supra note 9, col. 285.
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 one's stand on myriad issues may make up the totality of one's
 worldview, and indeed, incline one to a particular religion. Dismissing
 arguments of the religious by assuming they are religiously motivated
 erroneously denies such complexity. Acknowledging such complexity,
 on the other hand, requires that one takes each person's stand on a
 particular issue as it is and assess it on its own merits.
 In other ways, the Singapore government's approach mirrored
 Rawls's. Rawls claims that he resolves only the political question, just
 as Mr. Chua claimed that the metaphysical question of when life began
 could be eschewed. Rawls denies reliance on the whole truth, just as
 Mr. Chua insisted that the religious should not expect their idea of the
 truth to govern the lives of others:
 Is it right in our multi-racial and multi-religious society for any
 person or group of persons, on grounds of religious dogmas, to
 deny others, whose religious and ethical beliefs do not forbid them
 to have an abortion, the opportunity to take advantage of the
 provisions of this proposed law?140
 The problem is that the metaphysical question had in fact been
 resolved by allowing abortion. Given the metaphysical nature of the
 question, should religious arguments have been eschewed anyway, for
 fear of intractable differences entering into public decision-making?
 An opponent of the proposed law, parliamentarian Mr. Ng Kah
 Ting, suggested that his views were not religious in nature, even though
 he was Catholic, and that the metaphysical question could be settled by
 non-religious arguments:
 [D]o we find them arguing that abortion should be prohibited
 because the Catholic Church teaches that it is wrong? We do not.
 We find them arguing that abortions should be prohibited because
 it is bad for the nation. They ask that their case should be judged
 not on the merits of their religious beliefs but on the strength of
 their arguments. We may agree or disagree with their arguments,
 but we have no right to doubt the integrity of those who oppose
 it. . . . I am opposed to abortions not because I am a Catholic . . .
 but because I think it is wrong ... I am opposed to a liberalised
 abortion policy because I think this would be bad for our nation. It
 is very easy to write off the opposition to this Bill as "religious
 objections." This saves us the trouble of examining the rational
 arguments put forward against it. This enables us to evade the
 very pertinent questions raised, questions which have nothing to
 do with religion but which have a great deal to do with the welfare
 140. Abortion Bill 1968 , Second Reading, supra note 1, col. 1049.
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 of our people.141
 In the 1974 debates, Mr. Ng reiterated that he opposed abortion because
 of "human values."142
 But while science sheds light on the genetic composition of a
 zygote and the nature of embryonic and fetal development, some might
 argue that science per se cannot determine the worth of the unborn, and
 indeed, the worth of the full-grown human being. It can suggest
 something is a living organism, but that pronouncement is worthless for
 our purposes as it may be equally made in relation to an amoeba.
 Questions of worth are essentially moral or metaphysical in nature.
 Others, such as John Finnis and Robert George, take off not from
 medical evidence or science alone but from what they argue to be a lack
 of morally significant differences between the unborn and the newborn.
 Critics disagree there are no morally significant differences. Macedo,
 for example, disagrees with George's view that life history that began as
 a zygote "develops without substantial change" into an adult, saying it is
 unreasonable to deny that there are grounds for ascribing moral weight
 to the development of brain functions.143 Such disagreement is
 metaphysical in nature, i.e. over the worth of the unborn. The
 conclusions each reach as a result of their different ascription of moral
 weight at the developmental stages show the intractability of the debate.
 Macedo thinks that reasonable people disagree over the issue and
 therefore concludes that the necessary middle ground is to allow
 abortion up to a certain point in pregnancy:
 On policy issues like abortion which seems, as things stand, to
 come down to a fairly close call between two well-reasoned sets of
 arguments, the best thing for reasonable people to do might be to
 acknowledge the difficulty of the argument and the burdens of
 reason, to respect their opponents and to compromise with them, to
 141. Abortion Bill 1968 , Third Reading, supra note 9, cols. 325-26.
 142. Mr. Ng said {Abortion Bill 1974 Debates, supra note 80, cols. 1 125-26):
 Sir, it would seem that whenever a question of ethics is raised, the Minister would be
 like an ostrich, burying his head in the sand and refusing even to look up to the
 argument. Sir, I am told that even the most obstinate or determined ostrich must come
 up for air. So we may still hope that the implications of this Bill will be examined
 rationally, impartially, and without emotion. After all, if we were to think that the
 Minister is a man without any concern for ethical principles, we would surely be doing
 him an injustice . . . Unless the Minister wishes to be a complete ostrich, therefore, I
 think he will have to consider whether or not there is anything unethical about abortion.
 It is not a religious dogma or presumption of ethics. I opposed the former Bill because it
 was concerned about human values and that the then Bill would not be good for our
 country.
 143. Macedo, In defense, supra note 56, at 17-19.
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 find some middle ground which gives something to each side
 while the argument goes forward. The right kind of middle ground
 on abortion would acknowledge both the great weight due to the
 judgment of the mother and the fact that this choice concerns the
 continuance of another life. It would, perhaps, honor a woman's
 choice up to a certain point in pregnancy and also countenance a
 variety of measures that would not be permitted were abortion
 simply a matter of an individual's right to choose . . . The best
 solution may sometimes be to give something to each side.
 Moderation or magnanimity in the face of very strong competing
 cases offers a way of honoring not simply the best case but also
 the case that is very strong.144
 If one retorts that such middle ground is unacceptable in the case of
 slavery (i.e. that we would not have allowed people to own slaves even
 if they did not believe in the worth of particular races), Macedo replies
 that he does not think that slavery would have been a close call between
 two well-reasoned sets of arguments. He objects to what George
 proposes in the case of abortion because George does not think abortion
 to be a close call is applicable to slavery: cultural circumstances and
 other factors make it possible for "reasonable people of goodwill" to be
 "mistaken about even serious moral evils when ignorance, prejudice,
 self-interest, and other factors that impair moral judgment are prevalent
 in a culture or subculture."145
 Macedo may think that his approach of favoring the woman's
 autonomy is a sensible resolution of intractable differences, given what
 he perceives to be reasonable disagreement in the case of abortion.
 Unfortunately, the real intractability of the debate between Macedo and
 George, and between pro-choicers and pro-lifers, is over whether the
 arguments of either camp are reasonable. Macedo concludes that
 slavery is not a close call between two well-reasoned sets of arguments
 whilst denying George the same conclusion in relation to abortion,
 because he perceives the reasons offered by the pro-choice camp as an
 adequate rebuttal of George's pro-life point of view. Macedo' s starting
 point is also that there is a perennial and irresolvable conflict between
 comprehensive doctrines which leads him to eschew reliance on "truth
 as a whole."146
 Yet, Macedo' s reference to Planned Parenthood v. Casey as the
 middle ground is absurd from the pro-life perspective. As Wolfe and
 144. Id. at 16-17.
 145. M at 27-28.
 146. See, e.g., his critique of Sandel. Id. at 29.
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 George point out, if pro-lifers suggest that the middle ground lay in a
 prohibition of abortion to give fair weight to the unborn child's right to
 life while providing financial, medical and emotional assistance to
 women with difficult pregnancies, promoting laws that make adoption
 easier, educating people on costs of irresponsible sexual activity and
 equal responsibility of men, and focusing on penalties for abortion
 providers rather than women,147 such a proposal would be rejected by
 pro-choicers. This shows that Macedo's solution is in the same vein as
 the alternative he rejects and that it stems similarly from a
 comprehensive doctrine of non-cognitivism which he endorses as
 "truth."
 In the final analysis, whether as framed in the Singapore debates or
 in the George-Macedo or Finnis-Rawls debates, it must be
 acknowledged that legalizing abortion resolves the metaphysical
 question of the worth of the unborn. At the very least, allowing each
 woman to decide whether to abort while refusing to allow a woman to
 dump a newborn means that an unborn is not regarded as having the
 same worth as a newborn. If the metaphysical question must be settled
 either way, then metaphysical arguments should not have been sidelined
 by the view that only a political question is being decided. If religions
 or comprehensive worldviews that compete with religion are sources of
 metaphysical views, then religions and competing worldviews have
 something to offer for the settling of metaphysical questions. This
 realization is understandably deeply disconcerting for a pluralist
 democracy, as it shatters the illusion of an accommodative solution that
 respects every view.
 Ill . The Future of the Abortion Discourse in Multi-Religious
 Democracies
 Singapore's parliamentary debates in 1980 noted that in 1970,
 when the Abortion Act was first in force, there were 1913 legalized
 abortions or 4.2% of live births. In 1974, the year the second Abortion
 Bill was passed, there were 7175 abortions (or 16.6% of live births). In
 1979, there were 14,855 abortions (or 36% of live births). If cases of
 menstrual regulation were included, the total number of abortions in
 1979 was 16,999 (or 41.7% of live births), meaning that one unborn
 baby was aborted for every 2.4 babies born.148 Questions relating to
 147. Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe, Natural law and public reason , in NATURAL
 Law and Public Reason, supra note 1 22, at 5 1 , 6 1.
 148. Sing., Parliamentary Debates , vol. 39, col. 1551 (Nov. 28, 1980) (Dr. Augustine H.H.
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 abortion trends and unwanted pregnancies, particularly amongst
 teenagers, have continually been posed in Parliament.149 All around the
 world, decades of legalization of abortion have not erased the intuition
 of some (even the non-religious) that abortion should not be undertaken,
 or be other than the procedure of last resort. Further, in Singapore, the
 government has not seen it fit to remove the mandatory counseling
 guideline before a woman is allowed an abortion.150 There are
 compelling reasons to review the law: It was backed by social policies
 that were arguably no longer valid. There is greater awareness and ease
 of methods of contraception than before. The eugenics argument is
 likely to be considered repulsive and unacceptable today. Moreover
 there is greater knowledge of effects on women who have undergone
 abortions; and there is a larger body of empirical evidence of the effects
 of legalization of abortion sociologically. In the Singapore Parliament,
 questions posed recently in relation to whether the government would
 review the law on abortion were answered in the negative.151
 Those campaigning on principle for laws that do not as liberally
 allow abortion - whether on religious grounds or not - may, in a
 pluralist democracy, consider employing a pragmatic strategy of
 focusing on the undesirable social consequences of easy access to
 abortion. Apart from any upward trend in abortion rates, if access to
 abortion leads to undesirable healthcare costs which can be mitigated by
 methods of contraception, might not even an economics-minded
 government be persuaded to review its stance? Or, if access to abortion
 leads to increased likelihood of casual unprotected sex and indirectly to
 the increase in the number of people contracting sexually transmitted
 diseases, these figures should be highlighted. Might decreased access to
 abortion in fact spur more circumspect behavior, especially in times
 when sexually active teens know well how to protect themselves from
 pregnancy, but (in their own words) choose to have sex without
 protection "because of "the heat of the moment," or because condoms
 reduce sensation, or because of peer pressure"?152 These factors should
 Tan).
 149. For example, in relation to teenage abortions (Sing., Parliamentary Debates , vol. 45, col.
 440 (Mar. 8, 1985); Sing., Parliamentary Debates , vol. 72, col. 963 (Nov. 13, 2000); and Sing.,
 Parliamentary Debates , vol. 76, col. 41 (Feb. 28, 2003)); abortions generally (Sing.,
 Parliamentary Debates , vol. 47, col. 1105 (Mar. 24, 1986)); abortions performed by government
 and private doctors (Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 50, col. 1237 (Mar. 23, 1988)); measures
 to discourage abortion (Sing., Parliamentary Debates , vol. 54, col. 510 (Aug. 31, 1989)); and
 teenage pregnancy (Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 45, col. 164 (June 1. 1998)).
 1 50. Termination of Pregnancy Regulations , supra note 69.
 151. Government has no plans to ban abortion , THE STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 29, 2008.
 152. Rise in number of abortions , supra note 5.
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 be considered because nearly four decades later, people are far more
 knowledgeable about methods of contraception, so much so that the
 language of the parliamentary debates of 1969 and 1974, referring to
 education relating to family planning,153 seems archaic. Arguments
 crafted on these grounds are publicly accessible.
 Beyond accessible reasons, there should be recognition that the
 delineation of a political sphere is artificial. In a society governed by
 law, we are always denying others the freedom to do as they please even
 when their religious and ethical beliefs do not forbid such actions. For
 example, marriage laws prohibit polygamy, even though some do not
 think it wrong to have more than one spouse. It is also often difficult to
 ascertain if an issue is political or concerns the orderly reproduction of
 society and so on. An advocate of same sex marriages, for example,
 may oppose polygamy, but a fervent believer of the right to polygamy
 may opine that the right to marry more than one woman is a
 fundamental right of his and does not impinge negatively on the
 collective good. The question of whether an issue is political or
 concerns fundamental rights is itself often the very subject of
 controversy.
 Those who suggest that religious persons should not impose their
 religious dogma on others, while having a salutary vision of respecting
 each citizen and not encroaching on their autonomy more than is
 necessary for an orderly society, should also realize the irony inherent in
 the delineation of the political. What grounds the very belief that we
 should not impose on others and what makes us shun metaphysical
 questions is a metaphysical belief in the dignity and worth of each
 human. Underlying the emphasis on the legitimacy of public decisions
 is a consensus on the worth of each citizen. Such consensus, sadly, does
 not currently extend to the details of who is entitled to be treated as
 human and what rights they have. The realization that metaphysical
 questions are necessarily being engaged or decided in our choice to
 regulate or to leave particular decisions to the individual does not render
 public decision-making any easier. Debates in public decision-making
 may end up mirroring debates in our social life. Regulation of processes
 of decision-making is, in the final analysis, based on substantive values,
 and the manner of regulation of public decision-making may
 circumscribe the content of the decisions. Admitting these may make
 public decision-making more complicated. But it is hoped that such
 153. See, e.g., Abortion Bill 1974 Debates, supra note 80, col. 1116. Indeed, in the debates it
 was noted that many have bought into family planning: Abortion Bill 1974 Debates, cols. 1 131-32.
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 understanding leads to greater circumspection because of the magnitude
 and severity of the decisions we make in the public sphere. The sphere
 of the political in such matters as abortion is, for the most part, illusory.
 If our decisions cannot accommodate or respect every view, let us at
 least move forward with such a renewed understanding.
